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Right of Federal Officers to Search and Seize Without Warrant
Confined to Instances of "Inherent Necessity"
In the closing weeks of the last term, the United States Supreme Court
handed down an opinion which fares well to become one of the central
landmarks in that labyrinth of law known as searches and seizures. The
majority opinion in Trupiano v. United States' marks a new phase of the
battle over the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment2 which has raged
within the Court since the lines were drawn in the Davis and Zap cases3 in
1945, and plainly constitutes a victory for that faction of the Court which
reads the requirements of the Amendment most liberally in favor of the
individual. Without an express overruling of any precedents, it annunci-
ates a principle so broad that considerable doubt is cast upon the present
validity of pre-existing Supreme Court doctrine,4 and many lower federal
court decisions5 are now clearly discredited. In the Trupiano case a
radipally different judicial technique was employed for testing the legality
of searches and seizures without warrant incident to a valid arrest. Instead
of looking to the breadth or intensity of the search, or the nature of the
objects seized following arrest, the Court majority, by scrutinizing the
conduct of the law enforcement officers prior to the search, sought to de-
.termine whether or not there was "some other factor in the situation-
besides the arrest-that would make it unreasonable or impracticable to
require the arresting officers to equip themselves with a search warrant.' '6
If there was no such factor demanding summary action, the Court hold-
ing is that the mere presence of the arrestee in convenient proximity to
the contraband property will not justify its seizure. Thus if the officers
had reason to believe that criminal instrumentalities or contraband would
be found upon the premises and ample time was available to present their
evidence to a magistrate, it was their duty to do so, disregard of which
would result in judicial condemnation of the seizures made at the site
1 Trupiano v. United States, -U.S.-, 68 S. Ct. 1229 (1948).
2U.S. Const. Amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
3 In Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), by a vote of four to three,
it was held that constitutional protection did not extend to the seizure of ration
coupons at a gas station during business hours; in Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946), by the same vote, it was held that a government contractor who had
consented to periodic audits of his books could not object to the seizure of a check
evidencing fraud during one of the government audits. Note (1947) 37 J. Cr. L.
& Criminology 413.
4 The broad dicta in the following cases conferring an almost absolute right on
officers to search and seize without warrant following an arrest of persons com-
mitting crime have been substantially sapped of their former force: Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158
(1925); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 198 (1927); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
5 Mabie v. United States, 60 F. (2d) 209 (C.C.A. 3d, 1932); Rocchia v. United
States, 78 F. (2d) 966 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935); United States v. Feldman, 104 F. (2d)
255, (C.C.A. 3d, 1939); United States v. Esposito, 45 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
6 68 S. Ct. 1229, 1234.
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of the arrest.7 Save for certain exceptional cases, the requirement of a
search warrant is, therefore, made an absolute imperitive.
In the Trupiano case the Internal Revenue officers laid in wait for
their prey for nearly three months, all the while gathering evidence and
keeping in close contact with an agent who was working side by side
with defendants in their illicit distillery. Secret radio communication
was set up between the farm on which the still was operated and the
headquarters of the officers. Truckloads of alcohol were seized leaving
the farm prior to the raid. The landowner who had leased the property
on which the still was erected was in constant touch with the government
agents and was ready at all times to supply accurate testimony for pur-
poses of securing a warrant. Yet with all this evidence at hand, the fed-
eral agents commenced the foray armed with neither arrest nor search
warrants. Mere inconvenience, it appears, discouraged them from ob-
taining any. Their entry on to the farm was lawful as they came at the
behest of the owner himself. One of the agents, through an opening in
the barn, saw the defendant actually at work at the distillery equipment.
The arrest was then made and the apparatus seized along with several
hundred cans of alcohol. With this imposing array of contraband and
evidentiary matter the case was brought to trial, where the defendants
moved to suppress all the evidence seized during the course of the raid.
The district judge denied the motion, expressly commending the agents
for "good policemanship and efficient crime detection."8' The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam statement.9 The Supreme
Court, Mir. Justice Murphy writing for the five-man majority, reversed,
holding the arrest at the still as lawful but the incidental seizure of the
contraband property not legalized by the concededly valid arrest.10
Obviously the point at which the judicial eye is cast has been shifted
from the time and place of search to the antecedent circumstances. Most
of the previous decisions involving the validity of a search and seizure
incident to an arrest have discussed elaborately and with extreme refine-
ments the permissive scope of the search when made, without a retrospec-
tive investigation of what the officers at the outset had reason to expect
they might find at the site. The unsatisfactory character of the former
approach is illustrated by the widely-discussed Harris case. 1  There
illegally possessed draft-cards were seized after a meticulous hunt for
stolen checks in the defendant's apartment incident to a valid arrest
therein for forgery. The old charge was dropped, and Harris was tried
and convicted of the newly discovered crime. In all of the four exhaus-
tive opinions written in that case no workable formula was evoked for
determining just what objects were within the "permissible scope" of a
search not limited to specific objects or places by a previously-acquired
7 That this limitation has not been asserted by the Court previously is apparent
from an examination of the facts in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925),
dicta from which have been cited extensively on 'this point, where the narcotic
officers had ample time and evidence to secure a warrant but got by successfully
without it as long as they stayed inside the house where the arrest took place.
8 70 F. Supp. 764, 765 (D.C. N.J. 1947).
9163 F. (2d) 828 (C.C.A. 3a, 1947).
10-U.S.- , 68 S. Ct. 1229 (1948). Chief Justice Vinson dissented in an
opinion in which Justices Black, Reed and Burton joined. Id. at 1235.
11 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Note (1947) 38 J. Or. L. &
Criminology 244; Note (1947) 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 128; Note (.1947) N.C. L. Rev.
53; Note (1948) B.U.L. Rev. 485; Comment (1947) 1 Van. L. Rev. 60; Kizer, The
Fourth Amendment and the Harris Case (1947) 7 Lyr. G. Rev. 122.
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warrant. For the mine run of cases, the Trupiano rule dispenses with
this futile disputation concerning the availability to searchers of "public
documents,'12 contraband in plain sight,13 articles in the "immediate
possession,'1 4 purely evidentiary papers if a felony was stopped in opera-
tion,15 and so forth. Only if the searching officers can demonstrate, in
Mr. Justice Murphy's phrase, the "inherent necessity" of the incidental
search, e.g. as where great speed was required because of the imminency
of removal of the subject-matter from the jurisdiction,' 6 or where the
search was solely for the protection of the officers to uncover weapons
concealed in the room,1 7 will the question of extent of permissible search
and seizure arise. Presumably if the defendant can show that the officers
could have obtained a warrant describing the objects seized and failed to
do so, that is the end of it. Of course, it is clear that if there was insuf-
ficient evidence to constitute probable cause for the initial arrest, nothing
subsequently uncovered by the unauthorized search could. validate either
the search or the arrest. 8 Thus federal officers who fail to obtain a
search warrant, even though they are successful in lawfully arresting
their man on the premises which they desire to search, are caught in a
logical dilemma. If they profess to be seeking particular articles sus-
pected beforehand to be present in the room they will run afoul of the
Trupiano rule; if they admit to rummaging for nothing in particular
their search will be condemned as "exploratory. "19
As in every case where the obviously guilty are turned free, one must
ask what value the case has as precedent for the innocent, for that can
be its only justification. On its facts the Trupino case is certainly
shocking, yet this very quality may in its impact on law enforcement
officials help to dispel some of the indifference that is too frequently
shown to the warrant requirement.2 0 The decision may also raise anew
12 Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145; of. United States v. Shapiro, -U.S.----, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 1393 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13 Go-Bart Importing Co v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
14 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
15 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
16 Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). But of. United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581 (1948); Hart v. United States, 162 F. (2d) 74 (C.C.A. 10th, 1947).
17 This is the historical reas6n for the practice; see opinion of Cardozo, J., in
People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923).
18 Usually in such cases the "arrest" is merely a pretext for the search for
evidence. This may not be done, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Henderson v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 528 (C.C.A. 4th, 1926); United States v.
Kaplin, 89 F. (2d) 869 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.
(2d) 557 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948); "The Government may not justify the arrest by the
search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest," Jackson, J., in John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 11 (1948). Even if probable cause exists it will not,
without more, justify the invasion of a private storage place or outbuilding, Taylor
v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Edelson, 83 F. (2d) 404
(C..A. 2d, 1936); Roberson v. United States, 165 F. (2d) 752 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948).
19 Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Kirschenblatt,
16 F. (2d) 202 (C.C.A 2d, 1926). The general warrant which conferred upon the
police in colonial times the power of exploratory search without specification was
the evil at which the Fourth Amendment was aimed. See Paxton's Case, Quincy
471, et seq (Mass. 1761); Cooley, Const. Lim. (3d. Ed.) §470.
20 Testimony of United States Marshal in United States v. Mello, 66 F. (2d) 135
(C.C.A. 3d, 1933): Q. "Why didn't you go get a search warrant if you knew so
surely?
A. "I didn't figure I needed a search warrant. If I had the evidence to get a
search warrant, I had the evidence to seize it without. Id. at 137.
Teld: Search and seizure approved.
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the pertinent query as to whether suppression of evidence is really the
most effective way to reduce the number of lawless police raids. Aside
from the questionable deterrent effect these judicial fulminations may
have on the police, the remedy of exclusion of evidence is available
inevitably to the guilty alone while the innocent victim of a raid for all
practical purposes still goes without redress. As Chief Justice Vinson
remarked in his dissent in the principal case, the insistence in all situa-
tions on the use of a search warrant with its consequent proscription of
competent evidence "only serves to open an avenue of escape for those
guilty of crime and to menace the effective operation of government
which is an essential precondition to the existence of all civil liberties."
W. P. HmL
